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“The law’s greatest dilemma in its heavy reliance on 
forensic evidence, however, concerns the question of 
whether—and to what extent—there is science in any given 
‘forensic science’ discipline.”2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In criminal prosecutions, the government increasingly relies 
on forensic science.  Eyewitness identification has been relied upon 
much longer.  But is this reliance misplaced?  Both types of 
evidence seemingly come with a degree of certainty.  Yet there are 
very real problems with the underlying reliability of both types of 
evidence.  In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences published a 
report reviewing many forensic science disciplines.3  In 2010, 
Special Master Geoffrey Gaulkin issued a report to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court on eyewitness identification.4  Both reports express 
concern about limitations in these fields—limitations that juries, 
lawyers, and judges alike may fail to fully appreciate.5 
Advances in the field of DNA testing, in part, brought to light 
some serious problems in other disciplines of forensic science.  As 
DNA evidence exonerated the innocent, it became apparent that 
“in some cases, substantive information and testimony based on 
faulty forensic science analyses may have contributed to wrongful 
convictions of innocent people.”6  Two issues are presented in the 
NAS Report: First, there is a “potential danger of giving undue 
weight to evidence and testimony derived from imperfect testing 
and analysis.”7  Second, “imprecise or exaggerated expert testimony 
 
 2. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. & NAT’L RES. 
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH 
FORWARD 87 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT], available at http://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Report of the Special Master at 18, State v. Henderson, 937 A.2d 988 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 7, 2008) (A-8-08), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us
/pressrel/HENDERSON%20FINAL%20BRIEF%20.PDF%20(00621142).PDF. 
 5. See generally id.; NAS REPORT, supra note 2. 
 6. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 4. 
 7. Id. 
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has sometimes contributed to the admission of erroneous or 
misleading evidence.”8  The NAS Report does not indicate to whom 
it is referring when it speaks of the potential danger to give undue 
weight to evidence and testimony,9 nor does it identify under what 
circumstances erroneous or misleading evidence is admitted.10  At 
the end of the day, however, it is the judge charged as gatekeeper, 
the prosecutor admonished to be a minister of justice, and the 
defense attorney as advocate for her client who have the obligation 
to ensure the fact finder does not give undue weight to forensic 
evidence and testimony.  The obligation of the parties extends 
further: both the lawyers and the judge have an obligation to 
prevent or correct imprecise or exaggerated identification, forensic 
testimony, and erroneous and misleading identification or forensic 
evidence. 
This can be accomplished, in part, by requiring lawyers whose 
cases involve forensic science to demonstrate a level of competence 
to use such evidence.  Section II will discuss some recent, relevant 
shifts in the legal landscape that seem to reflect an awareness of the 
concerns of the NAS Report and advances in social sciences.  
Sections III and IV discuss recent findings which illustrate the 
limitations of eyewitness identification and certain forensic 
sciences.  Section V examines the NAS Report’s view of the needs 
(and failings) of the legal community in regards to forensic 
science.  Section VI proposes a response to the current situation, 
which should put the parties on better forensic science footing.  In 
conclusion, the authors note that if nothing is changed in the 
criminal justice system, nothing will change. 
II. SHIFTS IN THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
A. Procedural Changes 
In March of 2010, Judge Nancy Gertner, a United States 
district court judge in Massachusetts, issued a procedural order in 
light of the NAS Report.11  She ordered parties before the court to 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. 
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identify whether or not the parties intended to introduce trace 
evidence, whether a Daubert/Kumho hearing would be sought, and 
to identify witnesses and exhibits.12  Judge Gertner observed that, in 
the past, admissibility of many forms of forensic evidence was 
“effectively presumed, largely because of its pedigree—the fact that 
it had been admitted for decades.”13  In recognition of the NAS 
Report, the order declared that trace evidence’s admissibility would 
no longer be presumed, but rather that each case requires 
individual, careful examination.14 
Judge Gertner observed, “To be sure, the court’s treatment of 
this evidence relates directly to the adequacy of counsel’s 
treatment,”15 which should not be lost on practitioners in the 
criminal justice system. 
B. Limits on Testimony 
In October of 2009, Judge Paul Grimm, a magistrate judge in 
the United States District Court of Maryland, issued a Report and 
Recommendation restricting the testimony of the State’s firearms 
expert after a hearing, finding: 
[T]here is no meaningful distinction between a firearms 
examiner saying that “the likelihood of another firearm 
having fired these cartridges is so remote as to be 
considered a practical impossibility” and saying that his 
identification is “an absolute certainty.”  Neither is 
justified based on the testimony at the hearing or the 
literature and cases reviewed and discussed in this Report 
and Recommendation, and neither is warranted by the 
facts of this case.16 
As such, the recommendation limited the testimony such that 
the witness “only be permitted to state his opinions and bases 
without any characterization as to degree of certainty.”17  This and 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 3. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 2. 
 16. United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 536, 572–73 (D. Md. 2010). 
 17. Id. at 581–82.  This second recommendation is followed by third and 
fourth recommendations in the alternative, which would have allowed the 
sergeant “to express his opinions ‘more likely than not’” or in the third alternative, 
“to a reasonable degree of ballistic or technical certainty.” Id. at 582 (quotation 
omitted). 
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other recommendations were subsequently adopted by the trial 
court.18 
C. Standards of Admissibility19 
On June 18, 2010, Special Master Geoffrey Gaulkin issued a 
Report of the Special Master concerning eyewitness identification.20  
The Report was predicated on the review of over two hundred 
published scientific studies, articles, and books submitted by the 
parties.21  Additionally, seven expert witnesses testified over a ten-
day period.22  The special master was to determine whether the 
standard of admissibility used in the Manson/Madison test was still 
valid and appropriate “in light of recent scientific and other 
evidence.”23  The Manson/Madison test involves two parts: First, the 
court must decide if the eyewitness identification was 
“impermissibly suggestive.”24  Second, the court must determine if 
there is a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.”25  A subsequent analysis involves an evaluation of 
the following factors: the “opportunity of the witness to view the 
[suspect] at the time of the crime, the witness’s degree of attention, 
the accuracy of [the witness’s] prior description of the [suspect], 
the level of certainty demonstrated at the time of the 
confrontation, and the time between the crime and the 
confrontation.”26  The report continues, “The short answer to the 
Court’s question whether the Manson/Madison test and procedures 
are ‘valid and appropriate in light of recent scientific and other 
evidence’ is that they are not.”27 
 
 18. Id. at 548. 
 19. The reader may be surprised to see a section on eyewitness identification 
included in a paper on forensic science.  However, we recognize the 
recommendation of the researchers quoted in Special Master Gaulkin’s Report, 
“that eyewitness identifications be regarded as a form of trace evidence . . . .”  
Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 10. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 3. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. (quoting State v. Henderson, 2009 WL 510409, at *2 (N.J. Feb. 26, 
2009)). 
 24. State v. Henderson, 937 A.2d 988, 995 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) 
(quoting State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177, 182−83 (N.J. 2006)). 
 25. Id. (quoting State v. Madison, 536 A.2d 254, 258 (N.J. 1988)). 
 26. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 6 (quoting Manson v. 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)). 
 27. Id. at 79. 
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Special Master Gaulkin concluded that, just as with physical 
trace and scientific evidence, the burden should initially be on the 
prosecution to establish that the eyewitness is reliable.28  This 
“reliability inquiry” of course, would be expanded “beyond police 
misconduct to evaluate memory as fragile, difficult to verify and 
subject to contamination from initial encoding to ultimate 
reporting.”29  Placing the burden on the proponent of the 
eyewitness identification evidence is both “scientifically proper and 
procedurally wise.”30  Further, Special Master Gaulkin observed “it 
would be appropriate and useful for [the] Court to take all 
available steps to assure that judges and juries are informed of and 
guided by the scientific findings.”31 
D. The NAS Report and the Minnesota Court 
In State v. Hull, the Minnesota Supreme Court first 
acknowledged the NAS Report and the impact it may have on 
future court cases.32  Hull argued on appeal that he should have 
been allowed a prong one Frye-Mack hearing on the admissibility of 
both fingerprint evidence and handwriting analysis.33  Citing 
harmless error in light of other evidence, the court declined to 
address the issue.34  Justice Meyer likewise found the error harmless 
in her concurring opinion.35  However, Justice Meyer pointed out 
that the failure of the trial court to allow for a prong one hearing 
leads to an incomplete and unreliable record, upon which no 
decision could be based.36  Justice Meyer’s concurring opinion does 
not presumptively preclude the admissibility of fingerprint 
evidence, handwriting analysis, or any other forensic evidence.  
However, like Judge Gertner and Special Master Gaulkin before 
her, Justice Meyer suggests, “in order to present expert conclusions 
 
 28. Id. at 84. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 85. 
 31. Id. 
 32. State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 104 n.4 (Minn. 2010). 
 33. Id. at 104. Under the first prong of the Frye-Mack test “the court asks 
‘whether experts in the field widely share the view that the results of scientific 
testing are scientifically reliable.’”  Id. at 103 (quoting State v. Roman Nose, 649 
N.W.2d  815, 819 (Minn. 2002)). 
 34. Id. at 104. 
 35. Id. at 110−11 (Meyer, J., concurring). 
 36. Id. at 109. 
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based on these methods to a jury, the proponent of the evidence 
must first meet its burden under the first prong of Frye-Mack to 
show that its forensic evidence methods produce accurate and 
reliable results.”37 
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE STUDIES ON EYEWITNESS ID 
Whereas the error rate with regard to many forensic 
disciplines is unknown, there has been a great deal of study done to 
ascertain how effective eyewitness identification really is.  The 
findings are fairly consistent.  In archival studies in the United 
Kingdom, 39% of over three thousand witnesses correctly 
identified the suspect, but 21% falsely identified fillers.38  Because 
only 60% actually made identifications, the misidentifications 
amount to 35% of the “positive identifications.”39  Other studies 
indicate that, in actual cases, the error rate is approximately one in 
three.40 
Studies have shown that misidentification is a practical reality.  
A 1978 meta-analysis that reviewed 345 studies found “there is less 
than one chance in a million that a non-blind test administrator 
has no influence on the behavior of the subject.”41  Studies 
uniformly show witness confidence and witness accuracy are not 
closely correlated.  Suggestive procedures can enhance witness 
confidence, post-identification feedback can likewise enhance 
confidence, and witness perceptions about the ability to observe an 
individual—as well as their attention to detail at the time of 
observation—is inflated in relation to level of confidence.42  That 
said, studies have shown that jurors are not receptive to this 
information.  They tend to “underestimate the importance of 
proven indicators of accuracy,” and rely heavily on things such as 
witness confidence, which is not a good indicator of accuracy, 
overestimating a witness’s ability to consistently and accurately 
identify a subject.43  Studies with mock jurors further indicate that 
expert testimony can “sensitize” people to the issues, which can 
 
 37. Id. at 110. 
 38. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 15. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 20. (citations omitted). 
 42. Id. at 33−36. 
 43. Id. at 49. 
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impact eyewitness identification.44 
IV. THE NAS REPORT 
A. The Current State of Forensic Science 
The NAS Report provides practitioners in the law with 
information they might otherwise not be aware of.  “Often there 
are no standard protocols governing forensic practice in a given 
discipline.”45  In other words, there is no well defined methodology.  
One is free to do their work any way they choose.  “The simple 
reality is that the interpretation of forensic evidence is not always 
based on scientific studies to determine its validity.”46 
When there are protocols, “they often are vague and not 
enforced in any meaningful way.”47  With no standard protocols, a 
technique cannot be effectively validated.  There is no way to assure 
that the science is being done “correctly.”  The limits of the system 
cannot be tested where the system is not defined.  For example, 
with shoeprint analysis, individual characteristics from a questioned 
shoe print are compared with a possible source.48  However, “there 
is no defined threshold that must be surpassed, nor are there any 
studies that associate the number of matching characteristics with 
the probability that the impressions were made by a common 
source.”49  An illustration of what this means, practically speaking, is 
provided by the NAS Report.  When given identical cases of new 
shoes with accidental identifying characteristics, “there were 
considerable differences in the conclusions reached by different 
laboratories examining identical cases.”50  In order for a test to be 
considered “scientific” the technique must be testable and 
reproducible.  The testing done in the area of questioned shoe 
prints seems to suggest the method is not reproducible from lab to 
lab. 
Arson is similarly situated.  According to the NAS Report, 
“Despite the paucity of research, some arson investigators continue 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. 
 46. Id. at 8. 
 47. Id. at 6. 
 48. Id. at 146. 
 49. Id. at 147. 
 50. Id. at 148 (citation omitted). 
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to make determinations about whether or not a particular fire was 
set.”51  The NAS Report notes “much more research is needed,” in 
areas such as “the natural variability of burn patterns and damage 
characteristics and how they are affected by the presence of various 
accelerants.”52 
Even if different analysts follow the same protocol, there can 
still be an issue regarding reproducibility.  Fingerprint 
examination, for example, relies on the Analysis, Comparison, 
Evaluation, and Verification (ACE-V) method.53  According to the 
NAS Report, the same ACE-V fingerprint identification protocol 
“does not guarantee that two analysts following it will obtain the 
same results.”54  In other words, repeatability is not assured simply 
by following the protocol.  The ACE-V method is “too broad to 
ensure repeatability and transparency.”55  As such, ACE-V “is not 
specific enough to qualify as a validated method for this type of 
analysis.”56 
The NAS Report holds forensic DNA evidence in high regard, 
noting, “With the exception of . . . DNA analysis, . . . no forensic 
method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to 
consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a 
connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.”57  
Interpretation of DNA profiles, however, particularly in mixed 
samples, seems to have some of the same problems as the ACE-V 
method when it comes to reproducibility.  Proof of this can be 
found in a study done by New Scientist, published in August of 
2010.58  In the study, New Scientist took a mixed sample of DNA, 
generated from a gang rape in Georgia.59  Kerry Robinson was 
convicted, in part, based on the findings of two crime lab analysts 
who reviewed the data and could not exclude Mr. Robinson as a 
contributor to the sample.60  New Scientist took that same sample 
and sent it to seventeen experienced analysts at a single, 
 
 51. Id. at 173. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 137. 
 54. Id. at 142. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 7. 
 58. Linda Geddes, Between Prison and Freedom, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 14, 2010, at 
8–11, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/36034274/New-Scientist-2010-08-14. 
 59. Id. at 9. 
 60. Id. 
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unidentified lab in the United States.61  The results may surprise the 
lay reader and lawyer alike.  Instead of unanimous agreement, only 
one scientist concurred with the trial testimony, that Mr. Robinson 
could not be excluded as a possible contributor to the sample.62  
Four analysts made a finding of “inconclusive” and an astonishing 
twelve scientists actually excluded Mr. Robinson from being a 
possible contributor to the sample.63 
There is also a dearth of studies on error rates in some forensic 
science fields.  The rate of error in a given discipline is, in essence, 
“proportions of cases in which the analysis led to a false 
conclusion.”64  There are not systems that are well defined which 
can be relied on to determine rates of error.65  Distinct from an 
“error rate” is the issue of when and how errors occur.  This, 
likewise, is not currently known. 
The NAS Report has some fairly harsh words regarding the 
courts as gatekeepers.  “There is nothing to indicate that courts 
review bite mark evidence pursuant to Daubert’s66 standard of 
reliability.”67  Further, “[t]here is little to indicate that courts review 
firearms evidence pursuant to Daubert’s standard of reliability.”68 
B. The Current State of the Legal Community 
Chapter 8 of the NAS Report is dedicated to “Education and 
Training in Forensic Science.”69  Among the needs identified is the 
need “to educate the users of forensic science analyses, especially 
those in the legal community.”70  The Committee asserts parties, 
lawyers, and judges alike, would “benefit from a greater 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 9, 11. 
 64. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 120. 
 65. Id. at 188. 
 66. The Daubert admissibility standard includes consideration of the 
following, nonbinding factors:  (1) “whether a theory or technique . . . can be 
(and has been) tested”; (2) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected 
to peer review and publication”; (3) “the court ordinarily should consider the 
known or potential rate of error”; (4) “the existence and maintenance of 
standards controlling the technique’s operation”; and (5) “‘general acceptance’ 
can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.”  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 
U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993). 
 67. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 107 n.81. 
 68. Id. at 107 n.82. 
 69. Id. at 217. 
 70. Id. at 218. 
10
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understanding of the scientific bases underlying the forensic 
science disciplines and how the underlying scientific validity of 
techniques affects the interpretation of findings.”71  While the 
Report had much to say about the shortcomings of forensic 
science, it is unfair to lay the blame entirely on the forensic 
scientists.  The parties in the legal system are “encumbered by, 
among other things, judges and lawyers who generally lack the 
scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic 
evidence in an informed manner . . . .”72  As such, “the legal system 
is ill-equipped to correct the problems of the forensic science 
community.”73 
In reviewing reported decisions in criminal cases, an 
interesting pattern comes to light.  In these reported cases, trial 
court judges “rarely exclude or restrict expert testimony offered by 
prosecutors . . . .”74  Likewise, reported decisions “also indicate that 
appellate courts routinely deny appeals contesting trial court 
decisions admitting forensic evidence against criminal 
defendants.”75  Of concern in reviewing this pattern is that despite 
“serious issues regarding the capacity and quality of the current 
forensic science system[,] . . . the courts continue to rely on 
forensic evidence without fully understanding and addressing the 
limitations of different forensic science disciplines.”76 
There has long been a presumption that the forensic science 
at issue is solid, and that the practitioner got it absolutely correct.  
However, the Committee disagrees.77  “In short, the interpretation 
of forensic evidence is not infallible.  Quite the contrary.  This 
reality is not always fully appreciated or accepted by many forensic 
science practitioners, judges, jurors, policymakers, or lawyers and 
their clients.”78 
This lack of education and understanding is coupled with a 
pattern of admissibility, particularly in criminal cases.  “Unlike the 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 110. 
 73. Id. at 53. 
 74. Id. at 11; see also Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to 
Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, S107, S113 
(Supp. 2005) (“Although scientific evidence is often more reliable than other 
types of evidence, not all that purports to be ‘science,’ is.”). 
 75. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. 
 76. Id. at 85. 
 77. Id. at 87–88. 
 78. Id. (citation omitted). 
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extremely well-litigated civil challenges, the criminal defendant’s 
challenge is usually perfunctory.  Even when the most vulnerable 
forensic sciences—hair microscopy, bite marks, and handwriting—
are attacked, the courts routinely affirm admissibility citing earlier 
decisions rather than facts established at a hearing.”79  In addition, 
the defense bar generally appears to “lack the requisite knowledge 
and skills, as well as the funds, to succeed” in mounting a 
challenge.80 
Consider the following examples.  Imagine a woman, missing 
for three days, is found dead and naked in the woods.  Time of 
death is declared “give or take ten minutes.”  Imagine a forensic 
scientist testifying, “The only difference between the defendant’s 
DNA profile and the mixed sample from the gun is that the alleles 
on the gun are stochastically imbalanced.”  Imagine a fire 
investigator testifying, “Evidence of arson includes alligator 
spaulding.”  To the casual reader, these statements may appear to 
be obvious evidence of guilt.  Experts in the fields of forensic 
pathology, DNA evidence, and arson would strongly disagree.  The 
statements are scientifically unsupportable—in some instances, 
even nonsensical.  Should the prosecutor, defense attorney, and 
judge—untrained in forensic science—be faced with such a 
statement from a scientist (due to poor training, incompetence, or 
a desire to advance the evidence in a misleading or exaggerated 
way), lawyers may fail to appreciate the falseness of the claim.  Even 
with vigorous cross-examination, once committed, it is unlikely that 
a forensic scientist will acknowledge they overstated or misstated 
the science. 
Consider more likely scenarios.  An expert testifies the 
defendant cannot be excluded from DNA found at the crime 
scene.  Another testifies in an arson case that the presence of an 
accelerant was detected.  In addition to the potential for false 
claims, more likely scenarios are the failure of prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and judges to appreciate the significance, or lack 
thereof, of seemingly sound scientific statements.  When a 
conclusion such as “the defendant cannot be excluded” is 
presented by a forensic scientist, the attorney’s response, for 
example, should not be to (1) charge out a crime or (2) seek a plea 
bargain, but rather ask, what is the significance of this failure to 
 
 79. Id. at 107 (quoting Neufeld, supra note 74, at S110). 
 80. Id. 
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exclude?  How many other random people in the population could 
not be excluded?  One in ten thousand?  Or one in two?  
Regarding the presence of an accelerant, if the alleged arson 
occurred in a garage, an attorney can cross-examine on gasoline 
being stored in garages, present in lawn mowers, snow blowers, 
cars, and the like.  But what about wood floors in homes built in 
the 1970s or earlier?  How many people are aware that gasoline was 
used as a paint thinner?  These are only a few examples.  The need 
for education and subsequent competence in the area of forensic 
science is essential to quality representation—on both sides of the 
aisle. 
V. RAISING THE BAR IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM BY IMPOSING 
MINIMUM STANDARDS: A PATH FORWARD 
The report finds that the existing legal regime—including 
the rules governing the admissibility of forensic evidence, 
the applicable standards governing appellate review of 
trial court decisions, the limitations of the adversary 
process, and judges and lawyers who often lack the 
scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate 
forensic evidence—is inadequate to the task of curing the 
documented ills of the forensic science disciplines.81 
With the criminal justice system currently inadequate to cure the 
documented ills, what is to be done?  The NAS Report notes, 
“Unfortunately, it might be too late to effectively train most lawyers 
and judges once they enter their professional fields.”82  If this is the 
case, we must wait a generation to begin to address the problem 
adequately.  Alternatively, the parties in the criminal justice system 
can trust the forensic science community to fix the problem itself.  
Neither answer seems satisfactory.  Another alternative, however, 
does exist. 
Funding must be set aside to train judges, prosecutors, and 
defense attorneys in the underpinnings of science.  The truth of 
the matter is lawyers are presented with forensic evidence that they 
are ill equipped to handle.  “A fear of science won’t cut it in an age 
when many pleas of guilty are predicated on the reports of 
scientific experts.  Every public defender’s office should have at 
 
 81. Id. at 85. 
 82. Id. at 236. 
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least one lawyer who is not afraid of a test tube.”83 
Without education, lawyers are inadequate to handle the task 
of appropriately assessing the value and reasonableness of forensic 
science findings.  Education, of course, costs money.  It is 
inefficient to educate lawyers in forensic science as part of the law 
school curriculum, as suggested by the NAS Report.84  Many will go 
their entire career without dealing with a forensic science case, 
where others deal with forensic science as a matter of course.  
Perhaps the best approach, then, is to impose additional 
requirements on those lawyers who handle forensic evidence.  One 
possibility is to require a showing of a level of competence beyond 
the standard bar exam.  The proposal to require certification is not 
without precedent.  For example, in California, lawyers appointed 
as lead or associate counsel for death penalty cases must meet 
requirements beyond bar passage.85  Pennsylvania likewise has 
additional requirements, including a minimum number of hours of 
training specifically on death penalty issues.86 Philadelphia County 
has additional requirements, including that the lawyer “[i]s familiar 
with, and experienced in the use of expert witnesses and scientific 
and medical evidence, including, but not limited to, psychiatric 
and pathological evidence.”87 
Practically speaking, applying the requirement to judges would 
be more challenging.  While some counties have certain judges 
assigned solely to criminal cases, other counties use their judges as 
“jacks of all trades.”  Some counties have only a few judges 
presiding over the caseload.  Is it practical for one judge to be 
required to be certified in a two-judge county?  When balancing the 
need for education of the judiciary against the very real possibility 
of a wrongful conviction, the answer seems obvious.  While more 
research is being done, studies suggest courts “employ Daubert 
more lackadaisically in criminal trials—especially in regard to 
prosecution evidence—than in civil cases—especially in regard to 
plaintiff evidence.”88  In light of the fact that forensic science is 
 
 83. JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND 
HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT 162 (2003). 
 84. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 236. 
 85. CAL. R. OF CT. 8.605. 
 86. PA. R. CRIM. P. 801. 
 87. PHILA. CO. CRIM. DIV. R. 406-1. 
 88. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 11 n.21 (citing 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1.35, at 
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being admitted in courtrooms across the country as a matter of 
course, it is surprising that “[i]n most forensic science disciplines, 
no studies have been conducted of large populations to establish 
the uniqueness of marks or features.”89  If the judiciary is not aware 
of this and has not been trained on the significance of this, how 
can they be effective gatekeepers? 
Of course, if a judge is not interested in such special training, 
those cases could be assigned to a visiting judge.  Alternatively, 
perhaps lawyers could be given the option of filing on a 
noncertified judge as an additional safeguard, over and above the 
current allowance. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Eyewitness identification and forensic science have at least two 
things in common: both sets of testimony are subject to error and 
both have the distinct capacity to overcome the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt necessary to gain criminal conviction.  
The 2009 NAS Report points out the limits of many fields of 
forensic science.90  Studies on eyewitness identification routinely 
show a high error rate when it comes to positive identification.91  
Effective cross-examination and meaningful jury instructions have 
not proven sufficient to challenge the testimony of these witnesses.  
Education for legal practitioners involved in cases wherein forensic 
science is presented must be implemented. 
The subtitle to the NAS report states: “A Path Forward.”  As 
long as the justice system continues to do things the way they have 
always been done, the system will not be moving forward.  The 
forensic science community has taken steps to reexamine and 
improve practices.92  The legal community must do so as well. 
 
 
105 (2007–2008 ed.)). 
 89. Id. at 188–89. 
 90. Id. at 8. 
 91. See Report of the Special Master, supra note 4. 
 92. For example, a federal grant has been awarded to try to determine the 
rate of error in latent fingerprint evidence.  See HARRY T. EDWARDS, THE NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPORT ON FORENSIC SCIENCES: WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE 
BENCH AND BAR 3 (2010), available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/The%20Nas
%20Report%20on%20 Forensic%20Science.pdf. 
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